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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

how much Archuleta abandoned to the stream. No court in Colorado
has used the quantification rule previously but it flows naturally from
the doctrines of prior appropriation and beneficial use. The court
remanded to the water court for determination because that court is
the only appropriate place for such determination.
Gomez may demonstrate his beneficial consumptive use of
Archuleta's water by showing proof of the common predecessor-ininterest, Sabino Archuleta's, actual beneficial use compared to the use
made after the property transfers. He may also show that he was water
short during years he used only his own water rights or that he broke
out more acres into production by using Archuleta's rights. Archuleta
may show non-abandonment by demonstrating beneficial consumptive
use through sub-irrigation. If Archuleta can show consumptive use,
the claim for injunctive relief will not be frivolous and will invalidate
the water court's award of attorney's fees.
Justice Martinez dissented from the opinion, concluding that the
adverse claimant need not show he beneficially used a specific quantity
of water expressed in acre-feet. While not explicit, the record indicates
that Gomez beneficially used Archuleta's water, and the majority articulated no statute or previous case requiring the adverse possessor
demonstrate a quantitative beneficial use.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
Daniel Vedra
GEORGIA
Lee v. Ga. Power Co., No. A08A2291, 2009 WL 357992 (Ga. Ct. App.
Feb. 16, 2009) (holding: (1) Lee's property was subject to Georgia
Power Company's right to control the Tallulah River's flow; (2) a plaintiff cannot base a claim for the negligent release of excessive water
from a reservoir on the negligent storage of the water, unless the negligent storage caused or forced the release of excessive water; and (3)
the law does not require dam owner-operators to warn downstream
property owners when they release water).
In September 2004, heavy rains from Hurricane Ivan caused the
water level in Georgia's Tallulah River and Lake Rabun to rise rapidly.
Once the water in Lake Rabun rose above the Mathis Dam flood gates,
Georgia Power Company ("Georgia Power") released water into the
Tallulah River. Georgia Power did not warn downstream property
owners before opening the flood gates and releasing water.
Troy Lee ("Lee") owned downstream property adjacent to the
river. Lee claimed that once Georgia Power released water, the water
level inside his shop rose to six feet deep and damaged his property
and machinery. Lee sued Georgia Power claiming, inter alia, that
Georgia Power was negligent because it stored excessive water in Lake
Rabun reservoir and failed to warn downstream residents before it
opened the flood gates. The trial court entered a judgment notwith-
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standing the verdict finding Georgia Power not negligent. Lee appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia and claimed, in part, the
trial court erred when it: (1) directed a verdict that the deed to Lee's
property gave Georgia Power the right to drain and flush the Tallulah
River across his property; (2) charged the jury with incorrect instructions; and (3) denied his motion for directed verdict with respect to
Georgia Power's duty to warn downstream property owners.
First, the court addressed Georgia Power's rights under the deed to
Lee's property. The trial court concluded that the deed to Lee's property gave Georgia Power the "right to drain and flush" the Tallulah
River across his property. The court determined that interpreting the
deed was a question of law for the trial court to determine; here, the
trial court heard expert testimony that Lee's property was subject to
Georgia Power's right to control the river. Additionally, upon reviewing the record, the court determined that Lee stipulated to the deed.
The court, therefore, affirmed the directed verdict as to the deed.
Next, the court addressed the charged jury instructions. The trial
court's charge stated that "[i]t is the duty of the owner/operator of a
dam to use ordinary diligence in releasing water," and further that
"[t]he owner/operator of a dam has a right to release water periodically . . . ." The charge also indicated that lower riparian landowners
must base their claims against the dam owner-operator upon "the negligent release of excessive water from the reservoir behind the dam and
[not] ...upon the negligent storing of the water, unless the negligent
storing caused or forced the release of excessive water." The court
determined that the trial court's charge was an accurate statement of
Georgia law. Therefore, failure to charge the instructions in the exact
language Lee requested was not error.
Finally, the court addressed Georgia Power's duty to warn downstream property owners. Lee argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict with respect to Georgia Power's
duty to warn. When it denied his motion, the trial court held that any
duty to warn was a matter of tort law and therefore a question for the
jury. Moreover, Lee did not cite any controlling authority that required dam owner-operators, as a matter of law, to warn downstream
property owners when they opened flood gates. The court found the
trial court accurately stated the law, and accordingly did not err.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals of Georgia found that the trial
court did not err when it directed the verdict as to Georgia Power's
rights under the deed, that it gave proper jury instructions, and it correctly applied the law regarding the duty to warn downstream property
owners. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for Georgia Power.
Williamj Garehime

